MEMO FOR TIGER*CONFIDENTIAL 7/12/71

Dear Js,

If you have no objection, I would like to use you as a trusted duplicate depository of some rather sensational intelligence I got today, the authenticity of which I cannot establish independently. If breaks into two parts.

The less sensational is that the CIA approached those about to go abroad to get them to work, to get them to apply to a foundation for a study grant, and guaranteed that the grant would be made. Also on the CIA, Barghoorn had been their man for some 20 years before the Russians nabbed him.

What may be more significant is that the first overflight, end to end, of European Russia was not by the U-2s but by an RB 47, in 1954. The Russian reaction was recorded and carefully translated. They were hysterical. They were caught completely by surprise. Aside from not expecting so daring an operation, they were unable to do anything about it. Thus they began a crash program to increase their defense in height rather than in depth. Presumeably it is as a consequence of thiscrash program that they developed the rocket that brought Powers down. But none of this was secret from out government. And all Russian communications were translated after being recorded, thus the knowledge that the reaction was, indeed, hysterical.

Now this is not a reference to skirting the Black Sea or the North Sea. It is a real, honest-to-goodness transiting of the country, south to north or the other way, as I no do not recall which.

My source did not pilot that plane, or any of the others. But he is in a position to know more than any pilot, if he is truthful. If I have no independent knowledge, I also have no reason to doubt it, and it does make a kind of sense when one considers two things: the shooting down of that RB 47 after it was well away from Russian territory and over the North Sea, and JFK's efforts to get them back.

My source's security clearance, he says, was next to the very highest there is, that being one for atomic information.

I believe this RB-47 business was Air Force rather than CIA, but I suppose there is the possibility it was a hoint project.

Can one imagine how the Russians must have felt when they learned that a bomber had transited their heartland and they could do nothing about it?

And can one wonder about the effect this had on national expenditures, in both countries? Or how the efforts of one, and the successes, influenced the expenditures and efforts of the other to achieve balance or superiority? I suppose that if we were to trace arguments in support of massive budget allocations here, it would disclose that the Russian effort to acquire parity or more was used to j stify still greater expenditure along "defense" and missle lines here.

HW